Gao Zi I · Passage 03 / 20 · 孟子 6A.3

Mencius 6A.3: why calling mere life 'nature' is not enough

Gaozi defines nature as life itself. Mencius presses back: if nature means only what is alive.

告子曰:「生之謂性。」孟子曰:「生之謂性也,猶白之謂白與?」曰:「然。」「白羽之白也,猶白雪之白;白雪之白,猶白玉之白歟?」曰:「然。」「然則犬之性猶牛之性,牛之性猶人之性歟?」

gào zǐ yuē:「shēng zhī wèi xìng。」 mèng zǐ yuē:「shēng zhī wèi xìng yě, yóu bái zhī wèi bái yǔ?」 yuē:「rán。」「bái yǔ zhī bái yě, yóu bái xuě zhī bái; bái xuě zhī bái, yóu bái yù zhī bái yú?」 yuē:「rán。」「rán zé quǎn zhī xìng yóu niú zhī xìng, niú zhī xìng yóu rén zhī xìng yú?」

The philosopher Gao said, 'Life is what we call nature!' Mencius asked him, 'Do you say that by nature you mean life, just as you say that white is white?' 'Yes, I do,' was the reply. Mencius added, 'Is the whiteness of a white feather like that of white snow, and the whiteness of white snow like that of white jade?' Gao again said 'Yes.' 'Very well,' pursued Mencius. 'Is the nature of a dog like the nature of an ox, and the nature of an ox like the nature of a man?'

Priority note

A human-edited reading layer

Central question

Why does Mencius reject the claim that 'life is what we call nature' as a sufficient definition of human nature?

Direct answer

Because if nature means only being alive and growing, it becomes too broad to explain what is specifically human in moral life. A definition that erases the crucial distinctions explains nothing of consequence.

First principle

When a definition cannot preserve the decisive differences in its subject, it is not clarifying the subject; it is dissolving it.

Why it matters

This passage serves searches around Gaozi, the definition of nature, and why Mencius thinks an overbroad account of human nature fails philosophically.

What this passage is doing

This is passage 3 of 20 in Gao Zi I. The cleanest entry point is "Life is what we call nature". In context, it works as part of Mencius's argument about human goodness, desire, and the debates with Gaozi and can be read alongside Human nature.

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Book context

Gao Zi I is the central battleground for human goodness and the arguments with Gaozi.

Related principles

Citation note

Do not dismiss it as verbal sparring. Mencius is testing whether Gaozi's concept of nature can still explain human ethical distinctiveness.

Passage profile

Book
Gao Zi I
Location
孟子 6A.3
Position
Passage 03 / 20
Alignment confidence
99%